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Abstract
This paper studies children as a risky asset associated to an investment option. Chil-
dren provide utility but have a stochastic maintenance cost. We obtain several new results
relative to models where children are deterministic goods, among which: i) Higher child
risks diminish fertility and consumption. ii) Risk aversion speeds up fertility as households
use the safe utility derived from a child as insurance against uctuations in consumption.
iii) Fertility is increasing in the correlation between income and child cost shocks. The
household is reluctant to have children when positive cost shocks come together with bad
income shocks. The opposite result happens when children hedge income shocks. iv) The
sign of the correlation determines whether higher income volatility speeds up or delays
fertility.
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1 Introduction
Having children is a risky investment because it is not possible to exactly know ex-ante the
costs associated with raising a child (including the opportunity cost of the parentstime and the
e¤ects on their career paths) or the benets that they will provide. A parent cannot predict,
for example, how often her children will get sick, how much money and time that will cost,
whether the child will need extra support at school or instead gets a full scholarship, or whether
her child becomes a successful actor who brings in millions of dollars to the family. Moreover,
insurance markets for many of the aforementioned contingencies, especially those related to the
time costs for the parents, do not exist. Children are risky assets at most partially insurable.
Consequently, childbearing adds another source of risk to households.
In this paper we study the consequences for fertility and consumption of taking into account
that children are a source of risk that interacts with other risks borne by the parents. The ex-
isting literature has followed Gary Beckers seminal work in modelling children as deterministic
durable goods, without considering that children are also a stochastic asset.1 Considering chil-
dren as risky assets associated to an investment option enlarges the set of e¤ects that drive
fertility.
We study the problem of an innitely-lived household who has an initial level of assets and
every period gets some stochastic income, that we assume exogenous for simplicity. She gets
utility from consumption and can save at the risk free rate.2 The decision to have a child is like
the decision to exercise an option. Every period she can have a child or postpone the decision.
If she has a child then she is acquiring an irreversible, durable and non-tradable asset that
gives her utility, but implies stochastic exogenous costs.3 We focus on the uncertainty about
childrens costs and assume that the utility ow is deterministic.
Our main results are the following: i) Higher cost volatility diminishes fertility and con-
sumption. Intuitively, risk averse households are less willing to invest in riskier assets. Higher
risk results in higher precautionary savings. ii) Risk aversion speeds up fertility as households
use the safe utility derived from a child as insurance against uctuations in consumption. iii)
Fertility is increasing in the correlation between income and child cost shocks. The household is
reluctant to have children when positive cost shocks come together with bad income shocks (for
example, households who must reduce hours of work and damage their careers when their child
1Jones et al. (2008) and Tamura (2000) survey the literature on the economics of fertility.
2This is the only available asset. Thus, markets are incomplete.
3These are realistic assumptions given that once a child is born is very costly to get rid of her because of
sentimental reasons and legal constraints. Moreover, children do not depreciate and it takes several years before
they can live independently.
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are sick). iv) The sign of the correlation determines whether higher income volatility speeds up
or delays fertility.
These results come from the interplay of ve e¤ects that di¤er from the standard income and
substitution e¤ects: 1) As in any real options problem, having the option to time investment
implies asymmetric convex payo¤s ("in bad times do not exercise and wait for good times to
come"). This makes the value of the option increasing in child cost volatility and encourages
to delay fertility. 2) Higher cost volatility increases the risk of not exercising the option (the
range of tomorrow prices is larger). This pushes risk averse households towards earlier fertility
(exercise today at known price). 3) If the fertility option is exercised the child costs can be
thought as an income shock. Incomplete markets and preferences displaying precautionary
savings push the household to delay fertility to avoid new sources of risk. 4) A child is an
alternative source of utility di¤erent from goods consumption. The utility derived from being
parent can hedge uctuations in utility from goods consumption. This channel pushes for early
fertility to enjoy the children as an insurance mechanism. 5) When the income and cost shocks
are correlated, the sign of the correlation determines if the shocks hedge or add up each other.
Fertility speeds up when the shocks hedge each other.
Our analysis o¤er new insights that may help both in explaining facts and in the design of
pronatalist policies. For example, Stetsenko (2010) documents that U.S. fertility changed from
being countercyclical to being procyclical as female labor supply increased. This is consistent
with our model if the increase in female labor supply implies a negative correlation between
child costs and income shocks. On the policy side, our theory provides support for policies that
reduce the uninsurable uncertainty from raising a child (such as child care programs), and the
negative correlation between income and child costs shocks (as State-paid leaves of absence to
insure the parents career from children health shocks).
This paper contributes to the literature on the economics of fertility. Our innovation is to
focus on the risks coming from children themselves. Moreover, we analyze the fertility decision
from the perspective of the value of the fertility option.4 Our work is theoretical, we focus on
characterizing numerically a set of results that could not be proved analytically. We checked the
robustness of our results and provided comparative statics exercises to understand the e¤ects
of each parameter.
Our work complements the studies on the e¤ects of income uncertainty on fertility. Several
empirical papers have shown that fertility responds negatively to increases in income risk.5
4Ranjan (1999) is the only paper we are aware of that explicitely discusses having a child as an option,
however in Ranjans model, as in all existing models of fertility, children are deterministic.
5Adsera and Menendez (2011) focused on Latin America; Adsera (2005, 2006 and 2011) in Southern Europe;
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Conesa (2000), Choi (2011), Da Rocha and Fuster (2006) and Sommer (2011) are di¤erent
quantitative models in which income risk or unemployment delay fertility. In those models
children are deterministic assets. Our results when children are risky and with shocks adding
to income shocks suggest that this modication would reinforce the delays.
Moreover, our work also complements the literature studying children as an insurance mech-
anism (Portner 2005 surveys theoretical and empirical work). This literature has focused on
the insurance coming from children as another source of household income, or because children
take care of ageing parents. We show two other ways in which children serve as insurance
mechanism: 1) children hedge utility uctuations because they provide a safe ow of utility.
What is especially valued by low wealth households. 2) If children cost shocks are positively
correlated with income shocks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 motivates why a child is a source of risks and
how they correlate with income shocks. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 discusses the
theoretical results. Section 5 concludes. Details on the solution method are in the Appendix.
2 Why is a child a risky investment?
Children are sources of costs and benets, both monetary and non-monetary (E.g. the
opportunity cost of the time parents spend on them, or the a¤ection that children give to
the parents). Both costs and benets have a stochastic component. These risks come from a
variety of sources and change as the child grows. For example, newborns face risks of birth
defects.6 Di¤erent defects imply di¤erent costs. For example, Parish et al. (2009) document
wide heterogeneity in the costs for a low income family of having a child with special needs.7
Part of the variation is associated with variation across states in the income eligibility guidelines
for Medicaid and SCHIP. I.e., with variation in the amount of insurance against the shocks.
For child risks to a¤ect behavior they need to be noninsurable. In the U.S. that is the
case with most of the time costs for the parents. For example, most child care centers ask the
parents to take their child home when the child gets sick.8 The National Association for Sick
Bhaumik and Nugent (2006) on East Germany; Mira and Ahn (2002) in a sample of OECD countries; Sommer
(2011) in the U.S. Kreyenfeld (2005) provides a survey.
6The Center for Disease Control and Prevention has quantied the probability distributions:
http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/birthdefects/data.html
7Among these families with positive expending, 30% had expenses between $250 and $500, and 34% had
expenses of more than $500. Twenty-seven percent had expenditures from 5.6% to 25.8% of their total household
income.
8Hotz and Miao (2011) report that in the spring of 2005, 7.2 million children under the age of 5 (36.9%)
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Child Daycare says that there is a huge unmet need for sick child care. They estimate that
each day more than 350,000 children younger than 14 years of age, with both parents working,
are too sick to attend school or child care. And that working mothers are absent from their
jobs from 5 to 29 days per year caring for ill children.9
Why a child gets ill may be endogenous to the parentsbehavior. But, according to the
2008 National Health Interview Survey, exogenous shocks seem to be very important. This
survey reports that roughly 30% of the children missed 1 or 2 school days, 30% missed 3-5 days
and 10% more than 6 days. These numbers are quite robust to di¤erences in income, race or
education of the parents. Thus, parents with young children face exogenous risks that their
kids get sick. A sick child implies time and money costs (most health insurance plans have
deductibles and co-payments).
As the child gets older the risks evolve, health shocks are smaller (with accidents becoming
tail events) and uncertainty in education expenses become the main risks. There is large
heterogeneity on how expensive is to educate a child and part of it comes from uninsurable
random factors as childrens ability.
Are child costs risks correlated with income risks? Most of the times they are. Probably
the most common example are children health shocks that force the parents to divert time from
work. Hours not worked are usually not paid, and may harm the parents career path. Thus, in
this case a bad child cost adds to a negative income shock (in our model we will say they have
negative correlation). It may also happen that the shocks hedge each other (positive correlation
in our model). For example, the parents of child athletes receive negative income shocks as they
sacrice their careers to travel with their children, but this comes while their children receive
negative cost shocks (they earn money for the family). Or, as another example, eligibility
guidelines for public subsidies may imply that an increase in child costs allow the household to
qualify for public support, thus generating positive correlation between child costs and family
income.
In this paper we will not take a stand on which of the previous empirical facts is more likely.
We will study the theoretical consequences of the di¤erent possibilities.
were in some form of non-relative care, of which 4.6 million (23.3%) were in some form of organized child care.
Among employed mothers with a child under 5, 5.9 million of their children (52.1%) were in non-relative child
care, of which 3.6 million (31.9%) were in an organized care facility.
9http://www.nascd.com/
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3 Model
We analyze a discrete-time, partial equilibrium economy, populated by an innitely-lived
household whose utility function depends on her consumption of goods (ct) and on having or
not a child (It). The household starts without a child at time t = 0 and has the option to
have it at any moment. We denote by It an indicator function that captures the fertility status
at time t: it takes the value one if the household has had a child prior or at time t; while
it takes the value zero if she has not. We assume that the utility function is separable into
goodsconsumption and the utility from the fertility status. We assume Constant Relative Risk
Aversion for the consumption component:
u(ct; It) =
c1 t
1    
It
1  ;  > 1;  > 0; (1)
where  is the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient and  is a parameter that captures the utility
benet from having a child.
Every period the household earns a stochastic labor income stream (yt) : Moreover, if she
has had a child she must pay the stochastic costs (qt) associated with child rearing. We assume
that markets are not complete and the household cannot hedge against child cost or income
risk because she can only transfer consumption over time via the riskless asset. We denote by
r the constant one-period risk-free rate. Hence the wealth (W ) of the household evolves as
Wt+1 = (Wt + yt   qtIt   ct)(1 + r); (2)
where both income and costs are denominated in units of the consumption good that we use
as numeraire.
We model the dynamics of the stochastic processes as rst order autoregressions:
yt+1 = ay + byyt + e
y
t+1; (3)
qt+1 = aq + bqqt + e
q
t+1; (4)
(eyt+1; e
q
t+1)
iid N
 
0;
2y yq
yq 
2
q
!
; (5)
where  denotes the correlation coe¢ cient between shocks to income and child costs, while y
and q denote the volatilities.
The household maximizes time-additive expected utility over consumption and her parental
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status, i.e. she decides two things: whether and when to have a child, and how much to consume
and save every period. After she has had a child she only has to decide how much to save and
consume. The problem of the household before having a child is:
H(W0; q0; y0) = maxfct;Itg
E
" 1X
t=0
tu(ct; It)
#
(6)
s:t: (2)  (5): (7)
3.1 Solving the model
The problem has a recursive nature. Conditional on having or not a child, the households
decisions depend on her wealth, income and on the cost of the child. These are the state variables
of the problem. We denote by J(W; q; y) the value function of a household who already had a
child:10
J(W; q; y) = max
c

c1 
1    
1
1   + E [J(W
0; q0; y0)]

(8)
s:t: (9)
W 0 = (W + y   q   c)(1 + r); (10)
y0 = ay + byy + ey; (11)
q0 = aq + bqq + eq: (12)
The household without a child compares the value of having a child (the value function J),
with the value of continuing without child. Her Bellman equation is:
H(W; q; y) = max
I
(1  I)
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
maxc
h
c1 
1  + E [H(W
0; q0; y0)]
i
s:t:
W 0 = (W + y   c)(1 + r)
y0 = ay + byy + ey
q0 = aq + bqq + eq
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
+ IJ(W; q; y). (13)
As in the option pricing literature, we dene the continuation region as the set of realizations
of the state variables at which the household is better o¤without children and the fertility option
is worth more alive. The fertility region is the complement of the continuation region. The
10An apostrophe identies next-period quantities.
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boundary between these regions is the critical level of costs below which the household is better
o¤ with a child, q(W; y). This decision (or fertility) boundary depends on current wealth and
income:
q(W; y) :=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
sup q :
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
maxc
h
c1 
1  + E [H(W
0; q0; y0)]
i
s:t:
W 0 = (W + y   c)(1 + r)
y0 = ay + byy + ey
q0 = aq + bqq + eq
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
< J (W; q; y)
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
; (14)
where J (W; q; y) is decreasing in q. The household has a child once the stochastic cost process
is equal to or smaller than q(W; y):
4 Results
In this Section we analyze the predictions of the model. Given the lack of closed form
solutions we solve the model numerically to illustrate theoretical results that could not be
proved analytically. We check the robustness of our results. Since fertility occurs when the
cost is smaller than the boundary q(W; y); we refer to a smaller boundary as less or deferred
fertility.
4.1 Parameterization
In selecting parameters our goal is not to solve a particular numerical exercise but to
show our theoretical results. Thus, while we choose somewhat plausible values, we invite the
reader not to focus on the precise numbers but more on the comparative statics exercises. They
illustrate how changing the parameters a¤ect the results.
Concerning preference parameters: we assume  = 3 as benchmark coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion: This is in the ballpark of those standard in macro models, and of those used in models
with preferences additively separable in consumption and childbearing utility as, for example,
Becker et al. (1990), or Jones et al. (2008). We checked thoroughly how risk aversion a¤ects
our results. We assume one period in our model to be one year and set the annual interest
rate to 3%: As subjective discount rate  we assume 1=1:03: Concerning ; the parameter
which governs the deterministic utility from having a child, its value is crucial, especially for
low wealth individuals with low consumption. As a benchmark we set it such that the utility
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stream from a child equals 50% of the utility stream from consumption of a household with no
fertility option. This value is arbitrary and we will discuss how its changes a¤ect the results.
Concerning wealth and income we proceed in the following way: we set ay such that the
income long-term mean is normalized to 10; and consider di¤erent wealth levels in a grid ranging
from 1/2 to 6 times that value. This range gives us room to explore the e¤ects of wealth and
precautionary savings in the fertility decision of the households. We assume income shocks
to be fairly persistent, by = 0:88: Persistence is a consistent result in the empirical literature
(see Sommer 2011 for a survey of recent papers estimating stochastic processes for households
income using PSID). Inspired by that literature, we set the income standard deviation y to
0:19 and do comparative statics on it.
Concerning the parameters on the costs of a child: The U.S. Department of Agriculture
provides estimates of expenditures on children from birth through age 17 (Lino 2011). This
guides us to choose aq; the long-term mean of the child cost process, to match a long term child
cost mean of 18% of long term mean income. Then, concerning the most important parameters
for our study: the persistence of the child cost shocks (bq) and their volatility (q); we start
with an agnostic choice (bq = by; q = y) and elaborate intensively of how altering them alters
the results.11 As benchmark correlation we use  = 0; we will discuss how altering the sign of
this correlation matters.
Table 1 summarizes our benchmark parameterization. For each result we will discuss which
parameters we are varying.
Insert Table 1 about here
4.2 Results
We start by analyzing the inuence of cost volatility. Figure 1 reports the fertility boundary
as a function of cost volatility for di¤erent levels of risk aversion and wealth. In Panel B the
household is more than twice wealthier than in Panel A.
Insert Figure 1 about here
We nd two results: i) higher cost volatility diminishes fertility, but the e¤ect is less pro-
nounced for wealthier households. ii) Higher risk aversion increases fertility. These results come
from the interplay of several channels:
11Section 2 showed that there are di¤erent ways to think on the risks coming from childrearing thus we believe
it makes sense to study a broad range of parameters.
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1) As in any real options problem, having the option to time investment implies asymmetric
convex payo¤s ("in bad times do not exercise and wait for good times to come"). This
makes the value of the option increasing in the cost volatility for a risk neutral household.
For a risk averse household this channel is more subtle. On one side the previous argument
applies. The higher the risk aversion the higher the value of being able to time fertility
(avoid investing in bad times). However, when cost volatility increases also the risk of
not exercising the option increases. Intuitively, the household needs to choose between
exercising today at price q or having the option to exercise tomorrow. When cost volatility
increases waiting for tomorrow is riskier (the range of tomorrow prices is larger), what
pushes a risk averse household towards earlier exercise of the option.
2) Once the option is exercised, the household starts bearing the uninsurable risk of the
costs of raising a child. Her problem becomes a standard incomplete-markets consumption
problem with stochastic income.12 We can read this from equation (2) thinking on (yt   qt)
as income net of children costs: If the household has precautionary savings preferences
( > 0), then she will reduce consumption for precautionary reasons once exposed to an
additional source of net income risk. The precautionary savings e¤ect is present both
before and after the option exercise, but it is larger after the option exercise because
the option to time fertility provides some insurance (it allows to avoid investing in bad
times). Precautionary savings are increasing in risk aversion and child cost volatility,
while decreasing in wealth. Higher precautionary savings push the household to reduce
consumption and delay fertility.
3) A child is an alternative source of utility di¤erent from goods consumption. The para-
meter  governs how big this source is. The utility derived from being parent can hedge
uctuations in utility from goods consumption. This is an important characteristic of chil-
dren when we think of them as an asset class. They are assets providing non-monetary
utility. This channel pushes the household for early fertility to enjoy the children as an
insurance mechanism.
Channel 2 explains why the fertility boundary is decreasing in the volatility of the cost
of having a child. While for small volatility Channel 1 can partially o¤set Channel 2, as
volatility increases Channel 2 pushes the household to delay fertility. Wealthier households do
less precautionary savings (their Channel 2 is smaller) and Panel B reects this in a fertility
boundary with less steep as child risks increase.
12See for example Caballero (1991) and Wang (2006).
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Channels 1 and 3 explain why risk aversion () speeds up fertility. As child cost volatility
increases, the higher the risk aversion, the less prone is the household to wait for more favourable
costs conditions because there is higher cost uncertainty about tomorrow. Moreover, a child
is a way to hedge future consumption uncertainty bu¤ering negative income shocks. A child
assures a constant ow of altruistic utility that o¤sets low consumption levels. Higher  also
exacerbates Channel 2, thus making fertility less attractive for more risk averse households,
nonetheless Channels 1 and 3 dominate.
Figure 2 reports average consumption with the respect to the cost distribution. I.e., weighted
averages of the consumption associated with each child cost level with weights being the uncon-
ditional probability of each cost level.13 Panels A and B focus on households who did not have
yet a child. While Panels C and D report households with children. We compare two wealth
levels.
Insert Figure 2 about here
In all four panels consumption decreases as child cost volatility increases. And, as Channel 2
predicts, the decrease is steeper for households with children and low wealth (Panel C). Among
low wealth households we know from Figure 1A that those with higher risk aversion are more
likely to have children, and those are who decrease consumption more in Figure 2A. They are
substituting present consumption with the utility from being parents. When wealth is higher
it is harder to see these mechanisms.
Decreasing ; the utility that parents enjoy from the children would make the child more
attractive, what reinforces Channel 3. We see in Figure 3a that this pushes for higher fertility for
any wealth level. Figure 3b shows that when  is smaller households substitute more utility from
consumption with chidbearing utility, thus as child cost risk increases (higher cost volatility)
they increase their precautionary savings. As it is expected, the increase in precautionary
savings from the extra desire to have children is larger for less wealthy households (Panel A vs
Panel B of Figure 3b).
Insert Figure 3a about here
Insert Figure 3b about here
Figure 4a studies the e¤ects of child cost persistence (bq) on the fertility decision.14 The
e¤ects depend on wealth levels. For low persistence (small bq) fertility is decreasing for lower
13Numerical details are discussed in the appendix.
14Rewriting the cost process (4) as:
qt+1 = (1  bq)(q   qt) + eqt+1
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wealth households (increasing boundary) and decreasing for higher wealth households (decreas-
ing boundary). The intuition is as follows: when bq is low the cost process converges very fast to
the long-run mean cost level. Poor households that would have a child at costs below this long
run mean become more conservative, they know that any low cost level will be short-lasting.
Wealthy household, which can a¤ord children at mean cost levels, interpret the lack of cost per-
sistence as an advantage, they can absorb short term high costs thanks to their wealth bu¤er,
while they expect costs to decrease to the mean in a short amount of time. Thus, wealthier
households take advantage of the high speed of mean reversion to have a child at higher cost
levels and enjoy earlier childbearing utility.
Insert Figure 4a about here
Child cost persistence (bq) alters the relation between fertility and child risk, as shown
in Figure 4b. When bq is closer to 1 the cost level at which the fertility option is exercised
matters for long time. This reinforces the asymmetric convex payo¤s discussed as Channel 1:
the rewards from waiting to exercise in good times are higher because good times last longer.
Thus, higher bq delays fertility as cost votality increases.
Insert Figure 4b about here
Higher bq implies a substantial increase in precautionary savings. Figure 4c shows that aver-
age consumption with the respect to the cost distribution decreases very fast when persistence
is high. Bad shocks last longer and precautionary households save more. When persistence
is low shocks do not last long and consumption before fertility is almost insensitive to cost
volatility.15
Insert Figure 4c about here
Figure 5 shows an important e¤ect of child cost shocks. As discussed in Section 2, they
can hedge or reinforce shocks to income. Thus, fertility is monotonically increasing in the
correlation of income and cost shocks, regardless of the households risk aversion.
Insert Figure 5 about here
with qt+1 = qt+1   qt and q = aq=(1  bq) we can identify (1  bq) as the cost speed of mean reversion.
15The low cost consumption in Figure 4c looks at but it is not exactly at in reality, its variation is smaller
than the step size of our grid. Thus, since the numerical algorithm cannot capture those small variations the
consumption looks at.
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Intuitively, the household is reluctant to have children when positive child cost shocks come
together with bad income shocks. A pronatalist government may encourage fertility by altering
the correlation. For example, a negative correlation may be the outcome of child illnesses having
negative e¤ects on the parentscareers. State paid leaves in periods of high probability of child
illnesses may break the correlation.
The correlation of income and cost shocks alters how income volatility a¤ects fertility. This
is studied in Figure 6.
Insert Figure 6 about here
When shocks are uncorrelated higher income volatility defers fertility (decreasing boundary in
Figure 6) because of Channel 1 and 2. Higher income volatility pushes for higher precautionary
savings, and the household is reluctant to add the additional source of risk of a child to an
already volatile income. Moreover, when income volatility is high precautionary households
value even more the option to time fertility and are more conservative in exercising it. If the
correlation is negative the previous e¤ects are reinforced because bad child cost shocks come
together with bad income shocks. Thus for  < 0 high income volatility decreases fertility a lot.
This is consistent with the empirical literature on the e¤ects of income uncertainty on fertility
cited in the introduction.
However, when costs hedge each other, higher income volatility may push for earlier fertility.
We see this in Panel A of Figure 6. However, if the household is enough risk averse, the Channels
1 and 2 discussed before push for decreasing fertility even if the correlation is positive (Panel
B of Figure 6). These channels are tampered if income is not very persistent. This is shown in
Figure 7 that redoes Panel B of Figure 6 for by = 0:4 instead of by = 0:88.
Insert Figure 7 about here
When by is low, income shocks do not last long. Thus, there is lower need for precautionary
savings. Figure 7 shows that in this case when the shocks hedge each other ( > 0) higher
income volatility does not seem to a¤ect fertility. The hedging benet from having a child
is o¤setting the push for decreasing fertility from Channels 1 and 2 discussed before. Our
analysis then predicts that households with high but volatile and nonpersistent income (hence
very sensitive to the correlation between income and child risks) are those whose fertility rates
are reduced more by a negative correlation.
So far we have focused on comparative statics on wealth rather on income levels. For a
qualitative analysis this does not imply any loss of generality for very persistent income process
(as in the benchmark parameterization of Table 1). Figure 8 explores the e¤ects of di¤erent
13
levels of income persistence on fertility. Intuitively, households with bad income shocks (below
average current income) have more children when income shocks are not persistent (fertility
boundary decreases in by for low income household). The opposite trend happens for households
with good income shocks (above average current income).
Insert Figure 8 about here
Finally, Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the standard income and substitution e¤ects well known
since Becker (1960). In Figure 9, when children are more expensive (higher long-run mean of
costs) the household subsitutes them for goods consumption. In Figure 10, since children are
normal goods, fertility is increasing in wealth (Panel A), and income (Panel B).
Insert Figure 9 about here
Insert Figure 10 about here
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the joint consumption and fertility decisions of a household
who faces uninsurable shocks to both income and the cost of raising a child. Our model
emphasizes two main determinants of fertility: 1) income and child risks and their correlation;
2) The trade-o¤ between the safe utility ow brought by a child and the aversion to the risks
that the child implies.
Our analysis can be extended in a number of directions. For simplicity, we have not consid-
ered life-cycle e¤ects. This is a relevant factor in quantitative work as the ability to be fertile is
age dependent. We have also abstracted from the fact that income is endogenous and fertility
alters labor supply. Introducing these extensions into the model would allow to study career
and fertility choices together. We leave these extensions, together with empirical tests of the
theory, for future research.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Benchmark parameterization
r = 0:03  = 3
 = 22:54  = 1
1+r
 = 0
ay = 10(1  by) by = 0:88 y = 0:19
aq = 1:82(1  bq) bq = by q = y
Table 1: Benchmark parameterization. The values are discussed in Subsection 4.1.
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Figure 1: Fertility as a function of cost volatility. Panel A reports the fertility boundary
(critical cost at which the household has a child) as a function of cost volatility, when house-
holds wealth is the long-term expected income. Panel B reports the same variable when the
households wealth is 2.5 times long-term income. The solid, dashed, and dotted line correspond
to a relative risk aversion coe¢ cient  of 3, 3.5, and 4.5, respectively. The fertility boundary is
expressed as a fraction of long-term income. Both panels assume income at 65% of its long-run
mean. The other parameters are as in Table 1.
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Figure 2: Average Consumption as a function of cost volatility. The gure reports average
consumption for households who did not have a child yet (Panels A and B), and for those
who already had a child (Panels C and D). The average is computed over child cost levels as
discussed in the Appendix. In Panels A and C wealth is the income long-run mean, while in
Panels B and D it is 2.5 times higher. The solid, dashed, and dotted line correspond to a
relative risk aversion coe¢ cient  of 3, 3.5, and 4.5, respectively. Consumption is expressed as
a fraction of long-term income and all panels assume income at 65% of its long-run mean. The
other parameters are as in Table 1.
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Figure 3a: Fertility as a function of cost volatility for di¤erent levels of : In the solid line
 is calibrated such that the utility stream from a child equals 25% of the utility stream from
consumption of a household with no fertility option. In the dashed line to 30%. Wealth is the
income long-run mean in Panel A, and 2.5 times higher in Panel B. The other parameters are
as in Table 1.
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Figure 3b: Average consumption as a function of cost volatility for di¤erent levels of . The
gure reports average consumption (as a fraction of incomes long-term mean) for households
who did not have a child yet. The average is computed over child cost levels as discussed in
the Appendix.
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Figure 4a: Fertility as a function of persistence of childrearing cost (bq). The gure reports
the fertility decision boundary (critical cost at which the household takes the fertility decision,
as a fraction of income long term mean) as a function of the autoregressive parameter of the
cost process, bq, while leaving the long term mean aq=(1  bq) unchanged. The dashed line plots
a higher level of wealth than the solid line (70% of income long-run mean vs 60%). Income is
at 65% of its long-run mean. The other parameters are as in Table 1
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Figure 4b: Fertility as a function of cost volatility for di¤erent levels of cost persistence.
Panel A reports the fertility decision boundary (critical cost, as a fraction of income long-term
mean, at which the household has a child) as a function of cost volatility. The solid line has
bq = 0:4 while the dashed line bq = 0:88, in both cases the cost long-run mean is unchanged.
Wealth is the income long-run mean in Panel A, and 2.5 times higher in Panel B. The other
parameters are as in Table 1.
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Figure 4c: Average consumption as a function of cost volatility for di¤erent levels of cost
persistence. The gure reports average consumption (as a fraction of incomes long-term mean)
for households who did not have a child yet. The average is computed over child cost levels as
discussed in the Appendix.
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Figure 5: Fertility as a function of the correlation between income and cost shocks. This
Figure reports the fertility decision boundary as a function of the correlation () between shocks
to income and to child cost. Householdss relative risk aversion is  = 1:6 in Panel A and 3 in
Panel B: Solid lines plot current wealth at the income long-run mean while dashed lines at 2.5
times that value. The income is at its long-run mean. The other parameters are as in Table 1
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Figure 6: Fertility as a function of the volatility of income. Panel A reports the fertility
boundary as a function of volatility of income (y) : Householdss relative risk aversion is  = 1:6
in Panel A and 3 in Panel B: Solid, dashed and dotted lines correspond to di¤erent levels of
correlation between income and childrearing costs:  = 0.8, 0, and -0.8, respectively. In both
panels income is at its long-run mean and wealth is 2.5 times this value. The other parameters
are as in Table 1
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Figure 7: Fertility as a function of the volatility of income for lower income persistence. This
gure redoes Panel B of Figure 6 when by = 0:4 instead of by = 0:88:
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Figure 8: Fertility as a function of income persistence. This gure reports the fertility boundary
as a function of by, without altering the long-term mean of income. The solid line is for income
being 65% of its long-term mean and the dashed line for income being 125% of its long-term
mean. Wealth is at the income long-term mean. The other parameters are as in Table 1.
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Figure 9: Fertility as a function of the long-term mean of childrearing cost. The gure
reports the e¤ects on the fertility boundary of altering the long-term mean of childrearing costs,
while keeping unaltered the autoregressive parameter bq. Wealth is at the benchmark income
long-run mean, while income is 65% of its benchmark long-run mean. The other parameters
are as in Table 1.
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Figure 10: Fertility as a function of income, and wealth. This gure reports the fertility
decision boundary as a function of wealth (Panel A) and income (Panel B), both expressed as
fractions of income long-run mean. Parameters are as in Table 1.
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Appendix. Numerical Method
We discretize the state-space by setting: i) an equispaced grid of nW = 50 realizations for
wealth, with lower boundW1 = 5 and upper boundWnW = 60: As discussed in Section 4, these
values correspond to 0.5 and 6 times, respectively, the income long-run mean. ii) An equispaced
grid of nq = 25 values for costs, with lower bound q1 = 0 and upper bound qnq = 9:2. iii) An
equispaced grid of ny = 25 values for income, with upper and lower bounds yny = 12:5 and
y1 = 6:5; respectively.
The realizations of (y; q) on the grids follow a two-state Markov chain whose transition
probabilities approximate the transition density implied by the VAR process (3)   (4): They
are computed according to the variant of Tauchen (1986) method proposed by Terry and Knotek
(2010).
For each realization of y, q; and current wealth on the grids, we consider a grid of possible
consumption values such that next period wealth, computed according to the budget constraint
(2), takes values on the same grid as current period wealth. In other words, given present income
yz; cost qv; wealth Wi, and next period wealth W 0j ; we back out the implied consumption value
from the budget constraint (2), thus obtaining the consumption grid:
cj(Wi; qv; yz) =  
W 0j
1 + r
+Wi + yz   qv j; i = 1; : : : ; nW ; z = 1; : : : ; ny; v = 1; : : : ; nq:
This methodology is without loss of generality provided that the grid for wealth is dense and
wide enough.16
We compute the value function J(W; q; y) over the 3-dimensional grid by value function
16We have compared the predictions of this methodology with those obtained with the methodology described
below. Both yield the same results, thus we opted for the rst one that is less computationally intensive:
1) We set a consumption grid cj ; j = 1; : : : nc:
2) We determine a grid for next period wealth according to the budget constraint:
W 0ijzv = (Wi   cj + yz   qv)(1 + r)
enforcing the transversality condition by imposing the wealth lower bound W 0ijzv > W1.
3) We compute the value function next period corresponding to the o¤-grid wealth levels by linear interpolation
(weighted average of the value function at the closest wealth grid values)
J(W 0ijzv; q
0
m; y
0
l) = wjzvJ(W
0
ijzv; q
0
m; y
0
l) + (1  wjzv)J( W
0
ijzv; q
0
m; y
0
l)
where W 0ijzv  maxj Wj W 0ijzv; W
0
ijzv  minjWj  W 0ijzv and
wjzv =
W
0
ijzv  W 0ijzv
W
0
ijzv  W 0ijzv
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iteration, iterating the updating rule
Ja(Wi; qv; yz) = max
j
24(  W 0j1+r +Wi + yz   qv)1 
1    
1
1   + 
nyX
l=1
nqX
m=1
p(q0m; y
0
ljqv; yz)Ja 1(W 0j ; q0m; y0l)
35
(16)
until the convergence criterion maxi;v;z
jJa(Wi;qv ;yz) Ja 1(Wi;qv ;yz)j
Ja 1(Wi;qv ;yz)
< 0:001 is satised. We assign
an arbitrary small value to the value function whenever consumption is negative. p(q0m; y
0
ljqv; yz)
are the one-period transition probabilities of the two-state Markov chain for (q; y).
The consumption rule of a household with children is
cj(Wi; qv; yz) =  
W 0j
1 + r
+Wi + yz   qv; (17)
where j is the index achieving the maximum in (16) at the last iteration before convergence.
We compute the value function H(W; q; y) over the 3-dimensional grid by value function
iteration of
Ha(Wi; qv; yz) = max
"
maxj
"
(  W
0
j
1+r
+Wi+yz)
1 
1  + 
Pny
l=1
Pnq
m=1 p(q
0
m; y
0
ljqv; yz)J(W 0j ; q0m; y0l)
#
;
maxj
"
(  W
0
j
1+r
+Wi+yz)
1 
1  + 
Pny
l=1
Pnq
m=1 p(q
0
m; y
0
ljqv; yz)Ha(W 0j ; q0m; y0l)
##
; 0  t < T:
(18)
We use as convergence criterion maxi;v;z
jHa(Wi;qv ;yz) Ha 1(Wi;qv ;yz)j
Ha 1(Wi;qv ;yz)
< 0:001:
The consumption rule of the household without children is
cbj(Wi; qv; yz) =
8<:  
W 0bj
1+r
+Wi + yz if I(Wi; qv; yz) = 1
  W
0bj
1+r
+Wi + yz if I(Wi; qv; yz) = 0
(19)
where bj is the index achieving the maximum in (18) at the last iteration before convergence.
The notation I(Wi; qv; yz) emphasizes that the fertility decision depends on the current
values of wealth, cost and income on the grids. The fertility boundary, expressed as critical
4) We iterate the updating rule
Ja(Wi; qv; yz) = max
j
"
c1 j
1    
1
1   + 
nyX
l=1
nqX
m=1
p(q0m; y
0
ljqv; yz)Ja 1(W 0ijzv; q0m; y0l)
#
(15)
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level of cost given income and wealth, is:
q(Wi; yz) := max
(
qv : maxj
"
(  W
0
j
1+r
+Wi+yz)
1 
1  + 
Pny
l=1
Pnq
m=1 p(q
0
m; y
0
ljqv; yz)H(W 0j ; q0m; y0l)
#
<
maxj
"
(  W
0
j
1+r
+Wi+yz)
1 
1  + 
Pny
l=1
Pnq
m=1 p(q
0
m; y
0
ljqv; yz)J(W 0j ; q0m; y0l)
#)
; 0  t < T:
(20)
In the pictures reported in the manuscript, average consumption is computed as the uncon-
ditional expectation with respect the stationary marginal distribution of childrearing cost:
E [c(W; y; q)] =
R
Rc(W; y; q)f1(q)dq; (21)
where f1(q) is the Gaussian density with mean
aq
1 bq and standard deviation
qp
1 b2q
:17 For
households with child c(W; y; q) is (17) ; while for households without child c(W; y; q) is (19) :
17We approximate this integral as
Pnq
j=1c(W; y; q
j)wj ; where wj = f1( q
j+qj+1
2 )=
Pnq 1
j=1 f1(
qj+qj+1
2 ); nq is the
number of discretization points on the cost grid.
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